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By  reinterpreting Savage axioms as axioms of  the  social rationality over resource 
allocations, we derive a social welfare function encompassing individual social values 
and a social attitude towards distributional inequality. Wealth maximization becomes the 
purpose of law only if individuals have equal social values and the society does not care 
about distributional inequality. In tort law, when the injurer is less socially valued than 
the victim, the society imposes a stricter due precaution level, and punitive damages will 
be awarded.  Tort law also implicitly transfers wealth from the less socially valued party 
to the more socially valued party. (JEL: D70, K41, K49)  
 
1 Introduction     1 
The normative foundations of law have been  widely  debated among researchers. 1 
Utilitarianism implies maximization of  social welfare which is a  (weighted) sum of 
individual utilities. P OSNER [1979] highlights  the weaknesses of  utilitarianism in the 
economic analysis of law: apart for its shortcomings as a system of ethics and morality, 
an individual utilities based social welfare function also has serious shortcomings in 
guiding social and legal decisions, because of its difficulties associated with interpersonal 
comparison and aggregation of individual utilities. Posner proposes that the purpose of 
law is social wealth maximization, as “ it provides a firmer basis for a normative theory of 
law than utilitarianism”  (POSNER [1979, 103]). 
Although legal decision-making in real life is not based on individual utilities
2, 
social wealth maximization is also an over-simplified view for legal decision-making. 
DWORKIN [1980] argues that wealth is neither a value nor an instrument of social value. 
Some critical legal studies, for example, FITAPATRICK and HUNT [1987], assert that law 
systematically protects the interests of the more socially valued parties, thus does not 
maximize social wealth. CALABRESI [1985, 69] argues that: 
 
“ Who is the cheapest avoider of a cost, depends on the valuations put on acts, activities, and beliefs 
by the whole of our law and not on some objective or scientific notion”. “What is efficient, or passes 
a cost-benefit test, is not a ‘scientific’ notion separated from beliefs and attitudes, and always must 
respond to the question of who we wish to make richer or poorer.”  
 
                                                                   
1 See, for example, POSNER [1979], and DWORKIN [1980]. See also S HAVELL [2003]. 
2 For example, in eminent domain cases where private property is taken for public use by a state or municipality, the 
payment of just compensation to the owner of that property is not based on the owner’s loss of utility, but is based only 
on the fair market value of the property.     2 
In this paper we use the resource allocations, instead of individual utilities, as the 
consequence space for social welfare.  We justify the use of such social welfare functions 
by the social rationality over resource allocations, as rationality and consistency are basic 
requirements of legal decision-making. By reinterpreting the famous Savage theorem of 
individual decisions involving risk to social decisions of resource allocations (i.e., the 
state of the world in Savage’s theorem is replaced by the individuals of the society and 
the act space is replaced by all possible resource allocations), we show that the social 
rationality implies m aximization of a cardinal  social welfare function in the form of 
￿ = =
n
i i i x u x W
1 ) ( ) ( l  for  the  resource  allocation 1 (,,) n xxx = L . Most importantly, this 
social welfare function encompasses two important aspects in the social decision-making: 
a social value for each individual and a social attitude towards distributional inequality.   
In normative economics, researchers usually use welfarist social welfare 
functions.
3 For example, the famous  HARSANYI’s  [1955] social aggregation theorem 
uses the P areto indifference principle to obtain  a social welfare function  that  is a 
weighted sum of individual utilities, and claims that it provides support for utilitarianism.  
Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem has been established for many different 
formulations (see BLACKORBY, DONALDSON, AND WEYMARK [1999] and references 
in the paper). However, the resource based social welfare function has some very  useful 
features. 
 First, the resource based social welfare function reveals important social value 
judgments. The weights in the social welfare function are uniquely determined, intrinsic 
                                                                   
3 Welfarist is defined as the approach claiming that individual utilities are both necessary and sufficient for a social 
welfare function. A number of studies have argued for or against welfarist social welfare function.  See BLACKORBY, 
BOSSERT AND DONALDSON [2002], KAPLOW AND SHAVELL[2001], MONGIN [2000] for related issues.     3 
to the relevant social preference, and they represent the social values of individuals4 (the 
same as the weights in the subjective expected utility derived from Savage’s axioms 
which reveal an individual’s  belief about the probability of each state). The Arrow-Pratt 
coefficient of  function  u in the social welfare function  can represent social attitude 
towards distributional inequality.
5  
Second, the social welfare function derived in this paper is the one actually used 
in guiding social and legal decisions, representing “what is” instead of “what should be” 
in the decision-making.  The social value of each individual and the social attitude 
towards distributional inequality are  perceptions of a society and  do not  have  any 
meaning except in relation to the society. Therefore,  the social values and the  social 
attitude towards distributional inequality can be different in different societies.  
Although much can be said about the ethical and m oral issues using the type of 
social welfare function, we restrict our discussion to  its simple application in the 
economic analysis of law. We consider two hot debates: whether wealth is a social value 
and whether punitive damages should be awarded in tort law if there is no possibility of 
avoiding compensations. It is pretty easy to see that welfare maximization is equivalent to 
wealth maximization and thus wealth become a social value, only if all individuals have 
equal social values and the society does not care about distributional inequality.   
In standard economic analysis of tort law, due precaution level is determined by 
maximizing total social wealth, and the award of damage compensation is equal to the 
actual damage.  P OLINSKY  AND SHAVELL [1998] argue that punitive damages are 
                                                                   
4 “ The social value of each individual” may also be named as social influence, or social power of each individual. We 
didn’t see an accepted terminology for this weight. However, it should not be confused with the individual value as in 
ARROW’ s [1951] “Social choice and individual values”.  
5 The welfare function utilized in this paper can be generalized to situations without independent axioms and can 
incorporate explicitly the envy or altruism in the social welfare function (GILBOA AND SCHMEIDLER [1994]).      4 
awarded only because the injurers can avoid paying compensations with some probability.  
However, C OOTER  AND  ULEN  [1988] argue that punitive damages  are  necessary 
because some benefits that are not sanctioned by law could be categorized as illicit and 
therefore  can  not be incorporated into a social welfare function.
6 Some studies have 
argued that punitive damages are necessary because they  serve as a deterrence and/or 
retribution.
7 
Simple analysis  using resource based social w elfare function  shows that if the 
injurer is valued less than the victim by the society, the society imposes a due precaution 
level that is stricter than the one that maximizes social wealth.  Punitive damages must be 
awarded to induce the due precaution, and tort law implicitly transfers wealth from the 
less socially valued party to the more socially valued party. Therefore, punitive damage 
awards are needed because of the social value judgments. We also provide an explanation 
of the arbitrariness of the e xact amount of punitive damage award (DANIELS and 
MARTIN [1990]) by its sensitivity to the error in social value estimations.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 contains a discussion of 
rational social choice and the value judgments in the social welfare function.  Section 3 
contains an application of the proposed social welfare function  to two debates in  the 
economic analysis of law.  Section 4 contains concluding remarks. 
2  Rationality, Subjective Social Welfare Function and Value Judgment 
Legal decisions affect the resource allocations among social members. But unlike 
irrationality and inconsistency observed in politics, rationality and consistency are basic 
                                                                   
6 As pointed out by KLEVORICK [1985], it is not clear why there is a category called illicit, and what activities can be 
categorized as illicit. 
7 See BIGGAR [1995] and references therein for some studies about the punitive damage award.     5 
requirements for the legal decision-making. The famous Savage axioms (SAVAGE [1948]) 
can be reinterpreted to model the rationality of social decision-making over resource 
allocations.  
Savage theorem (SAVAGE [1948]) considers the rationality of individual choices 
facing risk. There is a state space  W  representing all possible states of the word, a set 
C of consequences and an act space } : { C f F ﬁ W = . An act  F f ˛ specifies the 
outcome in each possible state and an individual chooses the optimal act from all possible 
ones. Savage axioms consider the individual preferences over the acts. If all the savage 






i x u U ￿
=
= m .8 The weights  n i i , , 1 } { L = m  represent the decision-maker’s subjective belief 
about the probability of the states and the function  urepresents her attitude towards risk. 
Therefore, an individual’s choices reveal her belief about the probability of each state and 
her attitude towards risk. 
Savage axioms can be reinterpreted in a social decision setting. Each element of 
W represents a member of the society.  An element  c  of  the space  C  describes the 
amount of resource that a social  member can get.  The space  F  represents all possible 
resource allocations among social members: an element  F f ˛ (a mapping from  W  toC) 
specifying the resource allocated to each individual. A rational society  has preferences 
over different resource allocations and  it chooses the optimal resource allocation  in a 
decision-making.  
                                                                   
8 Here we assume that the state space is finite.     6 
We follow  Shaffer’s version of Savage’s axioms  (SHAFER [1986]), since it is 
more concise and intuitive. The Axioms are stated first and the discussion is provided 
later on. 
The ordering of social preferences over resource allocations in  F is described by 
a binary relation f. The relation  g f f  means that society prefers  f  to  g . If neither 
g f f  nor  f g f , then  g f » , indicates that the society is indifferent between  f  and  g . 
Postulate 1. (There exists a complete ranking): All resource allocations can be ranked by 
the society. The relation  f is irreflexive and transitive, and the relation  » is transitive. 
For each allocation  f in  F  and each subset  A of W, denote  A f  as the restriction 
of the mapping  f  to the subset  A, representing an allocation among social members in 
A . A subset  A  of  W  is null if  g f » whenever c c A A g f = , where 
c A  denotes the 
complements ofA. The resource allocations among null group of social members have no 
influence on social preferences.  
Given a subset  A of  W  and two mapping  p and  q  from  A  to  C , we write 
q p f  if  g f f  for every pair  f  and  g  of mapping in  F such that  p f A = ,  q g A =  and 
c c A A g f = . Given an element c inC , let  ] [c  denote the equal allocation that maps all s 
in W toc, i.e., every member receives equal resource  c. 
Postulate 2. (The independence postulate): If  g f f  and  c c A A g f = , then  A A g f f . 
Postulate 3. If  A  is not null, then  A A d c ] [ ] [ f  if and only if  ] [ ] [ d c f . 
Postulate 4. Suppose ] [ ] [ d c f ,  f  is equal to c on  A and d  on
c A ,  gis equal to c  on 
B  and d  on 
c B . Similarly, suppose that  ] ' [ ] ' [ d c f ,  ' f  is equal to  ' c  on  A  and  ' d  on 
c A ,  ' g  is equal to  ' c  on  B  and  ' d  on 
c B . In such a case  g f f  if and only if  ' ' g f f .     7 
Together with three other 3 postulates concerning about the boundedness and 
continuity of the welfare function (see S HAFER [1986, 468]), Savage theorem can be 
restated as: 
Savage theorem for social resource allocations:  Social preferences  over resource 
allocations satisfying all of the above seven postulates can be represented by a subjective 
social welfare  function  [ ] ) ( ) ( s f u E f W
m =  ,  i.e.,  g f f if and only if  ) ( ) ( g W f W > , 
where  m  is a  unique  probability measure on the  space W , the function uis bounded, 
continuous, and unique to an affine transformation, and 
m E represents the expectation 
with respect to m. 
If the society has a finite number of members, then any allocation can be written 
as  ) , , ( 1 n x x x L =  and  the subjective social welfare function can be written  as       
￿ = =
n
i i i x u x W
1 ) ( ) ( l   where  0 ‡ i l and   1
1 = ￿ =
n
i i l .
9   
We now discuss the postulates for the social rationality over resource allocations. 
The last three postulates are more technical and are not restated here; they do not impose 
significant constraints on the social rationality. Postulate 1 assumes that the society can 
rank all possible resource allocations. Postulate 2 is the most controversial in Savage’s 
theorem. Before turning back to it, we first discuss Postulates 3 and 4. 
Consider two equal resource allocations: in allocation 1 each individual has 
resource c while in allocation 2 each individual has resource  d . Postulate 3 states that 
if a society prefers allocation 1 to allocation 2, then, when constrained to the resource 
allocations among any sub-group of social  members A , the society  should still prefer 
                                                                   
9 In fact, Savage’s theorem normally assumes that  the space W  is infinite. As indicated by GUL [1992], some of 
Savage’s postulates require technical modification when W is finite.      8 
allocation 1 to allocation 2. For the special case where  A  has a single member,  } {s A = , 
i.e., when a social decision only affects a single individual, the preference ordering over 
the resource allocations is the same for any member, and the identity of the member is 
irrelevant to the ordering.   
In Postulate 4, suppose that the allocation  f  in which each member in subgroup 
A has the same resource c is preferred to the allocation  g  in which  each member in 
subgroup B ha s the same resource c (while all other members have the same resource d 
and  ] [ ] [ d c f ), if Postulate 3 is true, the only available explanation for the preference 
g f f  is that the society believes that members in  A have higher social values than 
those in  B . In order for this to work, the preference  g f f  must be unchanged when c 
and  d  are replaced by any other pair of the  amount of resource  ' c  and  ' d  with 
] ' [ ] ' [ d c f , as required in postulate 4. 
Now we turn to the most controversial Postulate 2. It states that if two resource 
allocations agree on 
c A , then the choice between these two allocations should depend 
only on how they differ on  A  and should not depend on how they agree on 
c A . This 
postulate excludes externalities among individuals in social resource allocations. (This 
postulate is similar to the independence postulate in FLEMING [1952], which is criticized 
by HARSANYI [1955]). Fortunately, without the independence postulate, we can derive a 
social welfare function (see GILBOA [1987], GILBOA and S CHMEIDLER [1994]) as a 
weighted sum of social welfare over all  possible  social coalitions, and it can be 
informally thought of as “utilitarian” with respect to coalitions and “egalitarian” with 
respect to individuals within coalitions. Z HENG  [2004]  discusses optimal income     9 
distribution under this type of social welfare function and obtains very interesting results. 
A complete discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
To explore the economic intuition of the parameter in the social welfare function, 
we c onsider a problem of  the  income redistribution among  n 
parties: ￿ =
n
i i i x u Max
1 ) ( l with the constraint w x
n
i i = ￿ =1 . Without loss of generality, we 
assume that  n l l > >L 1 . If  u is strictly convex, the optimal allocation leads to a corner 
solution where the first member receives all resource while the rest receive nothing. If u 
is strictly concave, from the first order condition  i j j i x u x u l l / ) ( ' / ) ( ' = , the assumption  
j i l l >  implies  j i x x > , i.e.,  the society allocates more resource to person  i  than to 
person  j. Therefore we can consider  i l  as the (relative) social value (or social influence, 
social power) of individual  i . Since members have different social values, dollars can 
worth different amount depending on who has each dollar. 
In expected utility theory, the Arrow-Pratt coefficient  ' / ' ' u u -  represents local 
risk aversion (PRATT [1964]).
10 Similarly in social decisions, for any income distribution, 
there is an equivalent equal income distribution that leads to the same social welfare. 
Society 1 has greater Arrow-Pratt coefficient  ' / ' ' u u -  than society 2 at all points if and 
only if society 1 is more inequality averse in the sense that, for any income distribution, 
the equivalent equal  income  for society 1  is smaller than for society 2. Therefore the 
Arrow-Pratt coefficient of the function  u  can represent the social attitude towards 
distributional inequality. The larger the Arrow-Pratt coefficient, the higher the degree of 
                                                                   
10 In expected utility theory, one decision maker has greater local risk aversion than another at all income level if and 
only if she is globally more risk averse in the sense that, for every risky income, her certainty equivalent (the amount 
for which he would exchange the risky income) is smaller than for the other decision maker. (PRATT [1964]).     10 
inequality aversion. From Postulate 3, the social inequality aversion also corresponds to 
the decreasing marginal social welfare of the resource hold by each individual. 
Proposition 1: In the following social welfare function representing rationality of social 
preferences over resource allocations,  
(1)        ￿ = =
n
i i i x u x W
1 ) ( ) ( l , 
the weight  i l  represents the social value of individual i and the Arrow-Pratt coefficient 
of the function u represents the social attitude towards distributional inequality. 
The obtained social welfare function is subjective to a society. DE FINETTI [1964] 
has formed the basis of the subjective probability. A probability does not have to be the 
objective frequency of an event; it represents the individual belief of the event. In our 
subjective social welfare function, social values of the individuals express the perceptions 
of the society about who is more important (or more valuable). Social value judgments, 
such as  the individual social values and the social attitude towards distributional 
inequality, are not objective and universal, and do not have to be imposed on all societies. 
As the perception of a society, these value judgments are determined by  the current 
political and social environments, past social experiences and institutional constraints, 
and they describe “w hat is” instead of “what should be”  in guiding social decisions. 
Different societies have different value judgments.  Therefore, the  value judgments 
included in the social welfare function have no meaning except when related to a 
specified society.   
The resource based social welfare function has its advantages in guiding the social 
decision-making. Resource allocations are observable and often verifiable, and there is no 
need to estimate and aggregate the individual utility, as in welfarist welfare functions.     11 
Another advantage is that there is a clear separation of individual social values and the 
social attitude towards distributional inequality. Such separation in the social welfare 
function will be very useful in future analysis of social decision-making, even though in 
the following we only need to consider a distributional inequality neutral society. 
This non-welfarist social welfare function has a similar welfarist version.  In 
Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem (see BLACKORBY et al. [1999] and reference in 
that paper), the strong Pareto plus an additional preference diversity condition11 also 
imply a social welfare function represented by a weighted sum of individual utilities with 
unique positive weights. However, unlike our social welfare function that has a clear 
economic  interpretation, there  is  much controversy in the interpretation and the 
significance of Harsanyi’s theorem. Since individual utilities used in the aggregation are 
ordinary, any increasing function of the individual utilities also  represents the same 
individual preferences. In order that Harsanyi’s theorem makes any economic sense, the 
individual utilities must be able to be compared interpersonally, a topic with  a  large 
amount of literature but also lots of disagreements.  
MONGIN [2000] observes that economists have started to reorient social choice 
theory into a non-welfarist direction and  he  suggests a  “ fourth stage of normative 
economics” .
12 Although the social welfare function used here is not welfarist, it does not 
provide any argument to imply that welfarist should be rejected. Intuitively, a society has 
no good reason to reject policies that improve the well-being of each social member, and 
the Pareto indifference principle should still hold. Welfarist approach and the approach 
                                                                   
11 The condition is equivalent to requiring the individual utility functions to be affinely independent. 
12 MONGIN [2000] provides some recent interesting arguments against the sufficiency and the necessity of individual 
utility for social welfare. The argument against sufficiency can be made in terms of socially undesirable aspirations, 
and the case against the necessity is expedited by taking note of those highly desirable objective achievements, good 
health, real freedom, etc.     12 
based solely on resource allocations are two different ways to look at the social decision-
making. However, these two approaches are not completely compatible. In a recent paper, 
BLACKORBY et al. [2002] shows that when the domain of a social evaluation functional 
consists of multiple profiles of both welfare and non-welfare information, any evaluation 
principle with unlimited domain, Pareto indifference and binary independence of 
irrelevant alternatives
13 must ignore non-welfare information.  In other words, a ny 
principle for social evaluation  with unlimited domain and binary independence of 
irrelevant alternatives that uses non-welfare information must fail to satisfy Pareto 
indifference. The resource based social welfare function in this paper has the domain that 
contains only non-welfare information, so it does not have to violate Pareto indifference. 
We believe further study can provide a better understanding of the relationship between 
welfarist and non-welfarist social welfare functions.  
One might criticize the resource allocation based welfare function because it does 
not consider how social preferences are formed. Actually, social preferences are the 
outcomes of fighting among individuals and the interactions of  many other factors. But 
we can still imagine that a  social  preference as well as individual preferences over 
resource allocations satisfies Savage axioms, and  we then  try to aggregate individual 
preferences into the social preference, as in  HARSANYI [1955]. Such an aggregation 
problem is equivalent to the problem of: (a) aggregating different individual views on 
social influence into a single social influence and (b) aggregating different individual 
attitudes towards distributional inequality into a single social attitude towards 
                                                                   
13Binary independence of irrelevant alternatives requires the social ranking of any two alternatives to depend on the 
utility information and non-welfare information associated with those two alternatives only.     13 
distributional inequality. However, MONGIN [1995] shows that such an aggregation is 
impossible.
14   
In t he proposed subjective social welfare function,  social values and  social 
attitude towards distributional inequality reflect the social and political powers, social 
norms, morals and institutional constraints. It would be very interesting to know how to 
estimate these social values and the attitude towards distributional inequality  in a given 
social decision-making. There is some literature on such estimations, see for instance, 
HAMPTON, MOORE, AND THOMAS [1973]. 
3  Application to economic analysis of law 
 
The social welfare function established in the previous section can be used 
straightforwardly to shed lights on standard debates in law and economics. We consider 
two most debated topics: the purpose of law and the award of punitive damages. 
 
3.1 Is wealth maximization the purpose of law? 
 Individuals are selfish, and they maximize their own utilities. For activities with 
significant externalities (either positive or negative) and high transaction costs, some 
kinds of social decisions have to be made. Legal decisions choose actions (or action rules) 
that are considered  to be optimal for the society,  but may not be  optimal for each 
individual.  
                                                                   
14 MONGIN  [1995] considered the aggregation of preferences satisfying Savage’s axioms. When considering the 
aggregation of relative social influence without considering the social attitude toward distributional inequality, affine 
rule is the only solution.  When we consider the aggregation of relative social influence together with aggregating 
attitude toward distributional inequality, dictatorial rule is the only solution with weak Pareto condition. With strong 
Pareto condition, there does not exist any solution.     14 
Suppose that the society chooses an activity e from a set  E of possible actions. 
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) ( ) ( w  be the total social wealth. From the preceding section, a rational social 
decision maximizes the social welfare function: 









Therefore, any legal decision must involve social value for each individual and a 
social attitude towards distributional inequality. 
Critical legal studies such as FITAPATRICK AND HUNT [1987] emphasize that 
there is no universal concept of justice or fairness. The framework utilized in the present 
study is consistent with their arguments. The social welfare function  is subjective to a 
society. Because societies are unlikely to have identical preferences, the value judgment 
in legal decision-making is likely to vary across societies. Changes in social environment, 
such as technological progresses and interest group activities, affect social preferences 
and  change social value judgments.  Lobbying activities are  used to influence social 
preferences; the activities of  judges and juries are attempting to recover the  social 
preferences. 
It can easily be shown that, if lump sum transfers are possible and wealth transfer 
is costless, a   welfare maximizing  society  will choose activities that maximize social 
wealth.  However, lump sum transfers are not always possible. A society cannot always 
freely transfer wealth  among individuals  because of legal and other constraints.  
Therefore wealth maximization is usually not the objective of the legal decision-making. 
However, there are  still  some cases in which wealth maximization is equivalent to     15 
welfare maximization.  If the society does not care about distributional inequality,15  the 
function  u  in the social welfare function is a linear function and  the resulting social 









If  i l  is constant for all  i , i.e., i f all parties  have equal social values, the 
corresponding  social welfare is equivalent to the total social wealth and  welfare 
maximization is identical to wealth maximization. For legal decision-making, this implies 
that the purpose of the law is wealth maximization. 
If  i l ’s are not identical, then welfare maximization is not equivalent to wealth 
maximization. When parties are assigned with different social values, the society chooses 
actions in favor of the parties with higher social values. The more diverse social values 
are, the less likely  social  wealth is maximized.  An activity that creates considerable 
wealth may still be socially undesirable if it hurts a party with a high social value while 
an activity that reduces social wealth may be socially desirable if it benefits a party with a 
high social value. 
The above discussion can be summarized as: 
Proposition 2: All legal decision-making involves a social value for each individual and 
a social attitude towards distributional inequality.  Legal decision-making can be 
described by welfare maximization, which is equivalent to wealth maximization only if all 
parties are valued equally and the society does not care about distributional inequality in 
the decision- making.  
                                                                   
15This is true in many cases of legal decision-making as redistribution of wealth can be better implemented through the 
income tax system and it is usually not one of the objectives of most legal decisions.     16 
POSNER [1979] claims that the efficiency in economic analysis of law is 
equivalent to wealth maximization and suggests that wealth maximization seems to be a 
more defendable principle than utilitarianism. DWORKIN [1980] argues that wealth is 
neither a value nor an instrument of social value. The above proposition indicates that, in 
certain cases, social wealth is a defendable social value. 
 
3.2. Efficient precaution level and damage compensation in tort law 
 
As another  application  to  the economic analysis of law, we consider the 
determination of due precaution levels and the award of compensation in tort law. 
Because of the conflicts between the  social preference and individual preferences, 
societies use their coercive powers to change individual choices. In tort law, a society 
specifies a due precaution level and uses compensations to induce individuals to behave 
in a manner that is consistent with welfare maximization. In the following, we show that 
the difference in individual social values can lead to precaution level and damage 
compensations that are very different from the ones that maximize social wealth in the 
standard economic analysis of law. 
For simplicity, we consider a case with only two parties: an injurer and a victim. 
The injurer chooses precaution level  athat  leads to a resource allocation between the 
injurer and the victim:  [ ] ) ( ), ( 2 1 a x a x x =  where  0 ) ( , 0 ) ( 2 1 < > a x a x .       17 
In tort law we can reasonably assume that  the  society does not care about 
distributional  inequality, i.e., u is linear. The social welfare function associated with the 
precaution level a is:
16 
(3)        ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( 2 1 1 1 a x a x a W l l - + = , 
where  1 l and  2 l  are the social values of the injurer and the victim, respectively. 
In the extreme case when the social value of one member approaches 0, her wealth will 
be ignored in  calculating social welfare. COOTER AND ULEN [1988] examine such a 
case where wealth acquired by some parties through illegal means is not included in total 
social wealth. 
In most cases of contract and tort law, social members have equal chance to play 
different roles in possible legal disputes and all parties of a legal dispute tend to have the 
same social value. T herefore, wealth maximization can be considered as the basis for 
legal decision-makings. This can explain why most  contract and tort law cases  are 
decided without an explicit reference to value judgment issues.  However, historically or 
due to interest group activities, the group of injurers and the group of victims may have 
different social values in some tort cases, in which wealth maximization is no longer 
consistent with welfare maximization. 
For a precaution level  a, the revenue and the cost function of the injurer are  ) (a R  
and  ) (a C , respectively, where  0 ) ( ' ) ( ' < - a C a R . A higher level of precaution reduces 
profit of the injurer. At the same time, the action causes a fixed damage D to a potential 
injurer with probability ) (a p . A higher level of precaution reduces the probability of an 
accident but at a decreasing rate:  0 ) ( ' ' , 0 ) ( ' > < a p a p . The action with precaution level 
                                                                   
16For simplicity we assume that social values do not depend on the injurer’s precaution level. In real life, the social     18 
a  results in an expected  allocation ) , ( 2 1 x x ,  with D a p x a C a R x ) ( ), ( ) ( 2 1 - = - = .  The 
social welfare associated with the precaution level a is: 
(4)      [ ] [ ] D a p a C a R a W ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 - - + - = l l .  
The optimal level of precaution 
* a is determined by the first order condition: 
[ ] [ ] 0 ) ( ' ) 1 ( ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( ' 1 1 = - - + - = D a p a C a R a W l l .  Therefore, the socially efficient 
precaution level 
* a  is determined by: 
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On the other hand, t he wealth maximizing precaution level  0 a  (which 
corresponds to the case of  2 / 1 2 1 = =l l ), is determined by: 
(6)     
D
a C a R
a p






Without the imposition of compensations, the injurer does not consider the 
externality imposed on the victim. The preferred precaution level for the injurer is 0. To 
increase the precaution level, the s ociety must provide incentives to the injurer by 
imposing an award of damage  K  to force h er internalize the externality.
17 Given the 
damage compensation, the injurer's profit after compensation is K a p a C a R ) ( ) ( ) ( - - . If 
the injurer's utility function is an increasing function of the profit, the injurer chooses the 
action satisfying: 
(7)      0 ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( ' = - - K a p a C a R  
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
value of an individual depends on her actions. 
17 Under a negligence rule, the injurer pays compensation K  only if her precaution level is less than the due care level.  
Under a strict liability rule, the injurer pays compensation  K  once damage occurs. From the standard economic 
analysis of law, both a negligence rule and a strict liability rule induce the socially optimal precaution.     19 
A comparison of (5) and (7) shows that, in order to induce the injurer to choose 
the socially optimal level of precaution, the compensation should be set to: 






There are three different cases for the due precaution level and for the compensation: 
1.  if 2 / 1 1 > l  (i.e., the injurer has a higher social value), by comparing (5) and (6)
 18, 
the due precaution level under a negligence rule is less strict than the precaution 
level  that  maximizes  the  total social wealth,  i.e.,  0
* a a < .  From (8), t he 
compensation to be paid is also lower than the full compensation, i.e.,  D K < . 
2.  If 2 / 1 1 < l  (i.e., the victim has a higher social value), the due precaution level 
under a negligence rule is more strict than the precaution level maximizing total 
social wealth, i.e.,  0
* a a > . The compensation to be paid is greater than the actual 
damage, i.e.,  D K > . The injurer has to pay punitive damages.  
3.  If 2 1 l l =  (both parties have equal social  values), the due precaution level under a 
negligence rule is equal to the precaution level that maximizes total social wealth, 
i.e.,  0
* a a = . The compensation is equal to the actual damage, i.e.,  D K = . 
The above discussion can be summarized as: 
Proposition 3:  In tort law, the due precaution level and the award of compensation 
depend on the relative social values of the injurer and the victim. If the relative social 
value of the injurer is smaller than that of the victim, the due precaution level is more 
strict than the wealth maximizing precaution level and punitive damages will be awarded. 
                                                                   
18 and using the fact that  0 ) ( ' ' , 0 ) ( ' > < a p a p .     20 
In the standard law and economic analysis, punitive damages can be awarded only 
if there is a possibility that the injurer can avoid compensations. The  amount of 
compensation is equal to the value of loss multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability 
that the defendant can escape from compensations  (see P OLINSKY  AND  SHAVELL 
[1998]). However, a large number of cases involve a situation where the probability of 
compensation is very high and punitive damages are still awarded (for instance in cases 
of assaults, pollutions, etc). Our simple analysis shows that the punitive damage award is 
possible even without the possibility of avoiding compensations. The punitive damage 
award is  the consequence of different social values of the injurer and the victim. 
Therefore, the punitive damage award is normally associated with social  value 
judgments.
19 
Most literature on tort compensations focuses on the award of full or punitive 
damages. Our analysis shows that less than full compensation is also possible
20. In the 
case of less than the full compensation, the action of the injurer is often regarded as 
accidental or inevitable. 
Next, we consider the expected post-compensation resource allocations. It is easy 
to see that under a strict liability rule, the payoff of the injurer is proportional to the social 
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+ - = , whereas the payoff of the 
victim is proportional to the actual damage:  D a p D K a p
1
1 2 1
) ( ) )( (
l
l -
= - . Therefore, if 
the victim has a lower social value than the injurer (i.e.,  2 / 1 1 > l ), she always ends up 
                                                                   
19 According to the usual formulation in practice, punitive damages can be awarded when the defendant’s behavior is 
malicious, oppressive, gross, willful and wanton, or fraudulent. It should be noted that the social value of an individual 
might not be simply determined by her social status, but might also be determined by the action that she has taken.     21 
with a negative payoff. If the victim has a  higher social value than the injurer (i.e., 
2 / 1 1 < l ), then  she always ends up with a positive payoff; alternatively, part of the 
injurer’s wealth is transferred to the victim in this case. A strict liability rule actually 
transfers the wealth from the less socially valued party to the more socially valued one. 
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The payoff of the victim is  D a p ) ( -  for 
* a a > , and  D a p D K a p
1
1 2 1
) ( ) )( (
l
l -
= -  for 
* a a < . Therefore, if the victim has a lower social value than the injurer (i.e.,  2 / 1 1 > l ), 
she ends up with a negative payoff. If the victim has a higher social value than the injurer 
(i.e.,  2 / 1 1 < l ), then  the payoff of the victim is positive  when the injurer is negligent. 
Even a negligence rule can transfer wealth from the less socially valued party to the more 
socially valued one to some extent. We can summarize the above discussion as: 
Proposition 4.  Tort law implicitly transfers wealth from the less socially valued party to 
the more socially valued party. 
The result is consistent with  that of CALABRESI [1985], who argues that  the 
choice of the due care level also reflects the choice of who we wish to make richer or 
poorer. It is interesting that this result is obtained under the assumption that redistribution 
is not an objective of the society, i.e., under the assumption that the function u is a linear 
function. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
20 DOBBS [1989] has considered the case of under-compensation.     22 
One of the characteristics of punitive damage award is its arbitrariness. Whatever 
the purpose of the punitive damage award, it is criticized as being unpredictable, even out 
of control.
21  SUNSTEIN, K AHNEMANN AND SHKADE [1998] examine the source of 
such arbitrariness. They selected 899 jury-eligible people and examined their 
deliberations of  some tort cases. They found that people's moral judgments are 
remarkably widely shared, (and punitive damages are largely determined by value 
judgments), but most people have a great deal of difficulty in  mapping their moral 
judgments to an unbounded scale of dollars. 
Such arbitrariness can be explained by the excessive sensibility of the dollar value 
of punitive damage award to the error in the social value estimation. When deliberating a 
case, a jury attempts to assess the social preference (i.e., the “sense of community”), i.e., 
to estimate the exact value of  1 l . Errors in such estimation are inevitable. Expression (8) 
shows that for a relatively large  1 l , a small error in the estimation will not significantly 
affect the value of  K . However, when  1 l  is very small (and a punitive damage award 
becomes necessary), the value of  K  becomes extremely sensitive to even a  very small 
error in the estimation of 1 l . 
Consider an example where the damage caused by the injurer's activity is  D . A 
jury tries to estimate the relative social value 1 l . Suppose there is an estimation error 1 dl. 
The estimated value of  1 l  can fall  into  the range  ) , ( 1 1 l l , where  1 1 1 dl l l - =  and 
                                                                   
21 In one study of 47 counties in US over a several-year period, the median verdicts ranged from less than $10,000 in 
some area to as much as $204,000 in San Diego. See DANIELS AND MARTIN [1990].     23 
1 1 1 dl l l + = . Therefore, the estimation of the damage award lies in the range  ) , ( K K  











For a numerical example, suppose there is an estimation error  05 . 0 1 = dl  and 
consider three different  values of  1 l : 0.9, 0.5, and 0.1. When  1 l = 0.9, the victim is 
under-compensated. The range of the damages award is from 0.053D to 0.176D. When 
5 . 0 1 = l , the range  the  damage award is from 0.818D to 1.220D. When  1 . 0 1 = l , 
punitive damages are awarded and the range of the damage award is from 5.667D to 
19.00D. These possible values of damage  awards demonstrate a significant degree of 
arbitrariness when punitive damages are awarded. 
Excessive sensitivity of the dollar value of the punitive damage award to the error 
in social value estimation suggests that procedures utilized for the determination of  the 
punitive damage award must be carefully scrutinized. As indicated by ELLIS [1989], such 
arbitrariness can be reduced if stricter procedures and very detailed judicial rules are 
developed. 
4  Concluding Remarks 
This paper  proposes a non-welfarist social welfare function for  legal decision-
making. The social welfare function  is based on the social rationality over resources 
allocations and  it  encompasses a relative social value of each individual  and a social 
attitude towards distributional inequality. It is derived by  reinterpreting the Savage-like 
axioms.  
As the social welfare function describes how legal decisions ‘are’ made instead of 
how legal decisions ‘should’ be made and as it encompasses social value judgments, the     24 
approach used in the paper can shed light on controversies in  the economic analysis of 
law. A straightforward application of the welfare function shows that social  wealth  is a 
defendable social value only if each individual has equal social value and the society does 
not care about distributional inequality. The determination of the due precaution level and 
the damage award depends on relative social values of the injurer and the victim. If the 
victim has a higher social value, the due precaution level is stricter than the one that 
maximizes the total social wealth and punitive damages will be awarded. We find that 
tort law implicitly transfers wealth from the less socially valued parties to the more 
socially valued parties.  
Since the framework we use can incorporate social value judgments, it can be 
very useful for the analysis of other field of law, especially for criminal law, where value 
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